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Abstract—Digital identity is one of the biggest challenges
in cyberspace. This field has been evolving for many decades
with a number of Identity Management (IDM) models being
proposed and employed; however, few were able to solve the
issue of sovereignty of an identity and storage-control of its
associated personal and confidential data. Self-Sovereign Identity
(SSI) was introduced to solve this crucial issue offering a user
full sovereignty of their identity and storage-control of their
associated personal and confidential data. Alongside ownership
of an identity, it maintains all private information in a Digital
Wallet which is owned and controlled by the user. However, SSI
is an emerging IDM, therefore it requires careful evaluation
of various aspects of SSI for it to become an operative IDM.
This paper proposes several specifications to evaluate any SSI
solution. Subsequently, it analyses two emerging SSI solutions
uPort and Sovrin. Finally, an evaluation of uPort and Sovrin SSI
is performed utilising the proposed specifications, highlighting
their strengths and limitations.
Index Terms—Self-Sovereign Identity; SSI; Specifications; Dig-
ital Wallet; Identity Management; IDM; uPort; Sovrin.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital identity is a core element of any digital platform
for its successful operation. However, it has been one of the
most difficult areas for cyber experts to master and provide a
complete solution, which is capable of proving the identity of
any entity in cyberspace, similar to that of the physical world.
Over the years, several IDM models have been proposed
and employed. However, until recently no model was able
to resolve the issue of sovereignty of an identity and storage-
control of its associated personal and confidential data. This
issue of sovereignty has affected several other related issues
with respect to identity such as security, privacy and safeguard-
ing [1]. With the introduction of blockchain, a new identity
management model called SSI was introduced which aims to
solve all the above issues and offers a user full sovereignty of
their identity and storage-control of their associated personal
and confidential data. Alongside ownership of an identity, it
maintains all private information in a Digital Wallet owned
and controlled by the user. The Digital Wallet is analogous
to a physical wallet saving all digital credentials as physical
entities, however, these credentials in the Digital Wallet are
digitally signed verifiable credentials and much faster to issue
and verify than their physical counterpart [2]. Furthermore, it
is a peer-to-peer model and does not involve any third-party
between the user and organisation.
SSI is an emerging model referred to as IDM 3.0, therefore
it requires careful evaluation of its various aspects for it to
become an operative IDM. Previously, several specifications
for evaluating its predecessor federated IDM 2.0 model were
proposed [3], [4]. This paper extends the evaluation of the
federated IDM 2.0 model by proposing several specifications
to evaluate the new SSI IDM 3.0 model. Subsequently, it
analyses two emerging SSI solutions uPort and Sovrin [5], [6].
The uPort SSI solution is built on the public permissionless
blockchain Ethereum and the Sovrin SSI solution is built
on the public permissioned blockchain Hyperledger Indy.
Finally, it evaluates both uPort and Sovrin SSI on the basis
of the proposed specifications to highlight their strengths and
limitations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II elu-
cidates the development of the three IDM Models: Centralised
IDM, Federated IDM and Self-Sovereign IDM. Section III
proposes the necessary specifications for SSI evaluation. Sec-
tion IV discusses the two emerging SSI solutions uPort and
Sovrin. Section V performs the comparative evaluation of
uPort and Sovrin based on the proposed specifications. Section
VI presents the summary of the paper and related future work.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTITY MANAGEMENT MODELS
This section presents the development of three IDM models:
Centralised IDM, Federated IDM and Self-Sovereign IDM as
shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Development of Identity Management (IDM) Models
Fig. 2. Centralised Identity Manage-
ment Model (IDM 1.0)
Fig. 3. Federated Identity Management Model
(IDM 2.0)
Fig. 4. Self-Sovereign Identity Management Model
(IDM 3.0)
A. Centralised Identity Management Model (IDM 1.0)
The centralised IDM model is the oldest IDM model,
in which an organization issues credentials to their users
permitting them to use their services. The trust relationship
between organisation and user is based on a shared secret,
in most cases, this is typically a login password associated
with a username [7]. The users identity related personal
and confidential data is always stored and controlled by the
organisation. Additionally, the user repeats this process and
requires separate credentials for each organisation or system,
they wish to obtain service from.
B. Federated Identity Management Model (IDM 2.0)
This federated IDM model solves two major issues: 1) it
removes the organisational burden of managing identity and
credentials securely by introducing a third-party called the
IDentity Provider (IDP), which is an additional task alongside
the main business operations and 2) it removes the burden from
users to manage several identity related credentials for several
systems by offering a Single-Sign On (SSO) facility [8], [9].
However, this IDM model has one similar issue in that the
abundance of identity related personal and confidential data
of a user is held by the IDP and therefore the user has no
control over this information.
C. Self-Sovereign Identity Management Model (IDM 3.0)
This self-sovereign IDM model is an improvement on the
federated IDM model, where it removes the third-party IDP
and offers a direct connectivity between a user and organi-
sation. Furthermore, it resolves the main issue of ownership
of identity related personal and confidential data of a user by
offering its full control through the use of a Digital Wallet.
The Digital Wallet saves all the identity related personal and
confidential data which is owned and controlled by the user on
the device controlled by the user. SSI assumes three key roles
i.e. Issuer, Holder and Verifier, in its ecosystem as shown in
Fig. 5. An issuer creates and issues credentials to a holder. A
holder receives credentials from an issuer, holds it and when
required, it shares these credentials with a verifier. A verifier
receives and verifies credentials presented by a holder.
Fig. 5. Self-Sovereign Identity Ecosystem
This SSI implementation is based on the Verifiable Cre-
dential (VC) [10] and Decentralized IDentifier (DID) [11]
standards which are proposed for creating a cryptographically
verifiable digital identity that is fully governed by its owner
[12]. A VC is used to represent similar information on the Web
to that of a physical credential in the real world. The DID is a
permanent, universally unique identifier and cannot be taken
away from its owner who owns the associated private key,
which is completely different from other ephemeral identifiers
such as a mobile number, IP address and domain name [12].
III. PROPOSED SSI SPECIFICATIONS
Several IDM specifications were presented in the past in
different contexts. Whether it was Kim Camerons Laws of
Identity [13] or Christopher Allens Guiding Principles of SSI
[14], they assisted the evaluation of new and emerging SSI
solutions and their success [15]. However, this (SSI) field
is evolving rapidly as is SSI requirements and standards.
Underlying these changing requirements, this section proposes
a revised and extended specifications to evaluate SSI solutions.
A. Sovereignty
Any individual who owns an identity must have the full
sovereign control of that identity, and it should not be con-
trolled by any other person, organisation or government. An
individual can decide its identity correlation across different
contexts without requiring any permission from anybody.
B. Storage-Control
Any identity and its associated personal and confidential
data should be owned and controlled by the identity owner,
leading to the introduction of the concept of a Digital Wallet,
keeping all identity related personal and confidential data on
the device which is normally owned and controlled by the
identity owner.
C. Longevity
Any identity must be eternal as long as its owner wishes,
however, it can be revoked or abandoned by an identity
owner. Therefore, an identity should be completely different
from other ephemeral identifiers such as a mobile number, IP
address and domain name.
D. Verifiability
Any identity should be verifiable through its credentials on
the Web in a way similar to a physical credential representing
the real world identity. This could be digitally signed by the
issuer and cryptographically secured; however, its verification
may not necessarily require any interaction with its issuer.
E. Recovery
The identity solution should be sufficiently resilient to
successfully recover any identity in the event of a lost key,
lost wallet or lost mobile/device. It should offer a number of
mechanisms to identity owners to recover and reassert their
identity in the event of a complete loss of credentials.
F. Cost-Free
An identity should be offered to general users free of cost
and it should not incur any hidden cost, licensing fees, or
any other financial charges for simply owning an identity.
However, this may not apply to costs related to other resources
and implementations.
G. Security
The security of an identity and its related communication
is paramount for any SSI solution. It includes various security
levels for identity such as cryptographically secure connec-
tions and communications, digitally signed transactions, and
decentralized and encrypted storage.
H. Privacy
As an aim, any identity owner should only be requested
to provide or disclose the minimum identity information
required for verification or service while maintaining as much
anonymity as possible. The SSI solution should not provide
any mechanism to correlate biometric data with an underlying
identity. Any identity related personal and confidential data
should only be shared after seeking the consent from its owner.
I. Safeguard
The freedom and right of every identity owner should be
safeguarded. This is accomplished by employing an indepen-
dent authentication system for an identity. In the case of a
conflict between identity owner and the identity network, the
rights of an identity owner should be safeguarded.
J. Accessibility
Any identity related solution and services should be user-
friendly and accessible by as many people as possible. This is
of greater importance for non-technical and vulnerable people.
K. Availability
Any identity related solutions and services should be avail-
able to all without any discrimination based on their ethnicity,
gender, socio-economic status, or language.
L. Transparency
All systems, protocols and algorithms employed in any iden-
tity solution should be free, open-source, and as independent
as possible of any particular architecture or proprietorship.
Presently, the SSI community has been consulting on several
open standards and forums to make this possible such as the
Decentralized Identity Foundation (DIF), the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) and the Organisation for the Advancement
of Structured Information Standards (OASIS).
M. Portability
An identity and its associated data should be easily trans-
portable from one platform to another platform. This requires
the standardisation of identity, credential and data/file formats.
N. Interoperability
Two different identity solutions should be capable of com-
municating with each other at scale. This will enable en-
terprises and government organisations to communicate with
each other irrespective of their employed identity solutions.
O. Scalability
Any identity solution should be able to accommodate the
increasing demand of a sovereign identity required for a
large number of users, organisations and entities. This will
determine the effectiveness of an SSI solution with respect to
significant proliferation in digital entities in cyberspace.
IV. UPORT AND SOVRIN SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY
A. uPort Self-Sovereign Identity
uPort is an open source framework for delivering a decen-
tralized identity for a self-sovereign identity. Based on the
public permissionless blockchain Ethereum and utilising its
smart contracts [5]. A smart contract is a program written to
automatically observe, accomplish and implement an agree-
ment. Employing this framework, users can securely publish
their identity including transferring their credentials, sign
transactions and control their keys and data. A uPort identity
can be created for users, organisations, and other resources.
The identity is completely owned and governed by the owner
Fig. 6. uPort SSI Components
of that identity and not by the third-party. Additionally, all
identity related personal and confidential data is held by the
owner in their digital wallet thus, information releases are kept
to a minimum [16]. The components of the uPort system are
as follows [5]:
1) Smart Contract Components:
Controller Contract: It is the overall control logic with the
functionality of controlling the access to the proxy contract.
Furthermore, it allows the user to reclaim their identity if the
user loses their mobile and private key. It maintains a list
of recovery delegates (e.g. selected family members, friends
or institutions) who can assist the user to regain their uPort
identity.
Proxy Contract: It is the permanent identifier of a user
linked with the private key of the user, therefore, it allows
the user to replace their private key without affecting their
permanent identity.
Registry Contract: It offers a cryptographic link between a
uPort identifier and its data attributes or profile data stored
off-blockchain (e.g. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)). IPFS
is a peer-to-peer protocol for storing and retrieving data on
a distributed file system. The proxy contract can only update
the Registry contract.
2) Server Components:
Chasqui: The Message Server manages all aspects of com-
munications with any decentralized app and mobile app.
Sensui: The Gas Fuelling Server avoids the requirement of a
new Ethereum user to purchase Ether and paying fees to use
the network. It pays the gas fees for the new user allowing
them to create a new uPort account instantly.
Infura Ethereum RPC: This Infura API provides a stan-
dard RPC interface to allow uPort to communicate with the
Ethereum network.
Infura IPFS: The Infura API provides a standard interface
to allow uPort to communicate with the IPFS network.
B. Sovrin Self-Sovereign Identity
Sovrin is an open source framework for delivering a de-
centralized identity for SSI. It is based on the public permis-
sioned blockchain Hyperledger Indy. As it is a permissioned
blockchain, therefore, only trusted institutions called stewards
can operate nodes while participating in the consensus process.
Utilising this framework, users can securely publish their
identity including transfer their credentials, sign transactions
and control their keys and data. A Sovrin identity can be
created for users, organisations, and other resources. Sovrin
allows users to create a different identity with its own pair
of private and public keys for different contexts to maintain
confidentiality. A user determines the type of attributes to be
associated with their identity. It uses anonymous credentials
based on Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), a cryptographic
method, to keep a user’s identities anonymous. The identity is
completely owned by the owner of that identity and managed
by the user or users appointed guardian service. Furthermore,
all identity related personal and confidential data is held by the
owner in their digital wallet on the edge or cloud. Components
of the Sovrin system are as follows [17]:
1) Sovrin Agents:
A Sovrin Agent is a program required for an identity owner
or any other participating entity to interact with each other in
the SSI process. Agents work in a peer-to-peer model and
share DID and other credentials with each other. They do
not require access to blockchain and communicate thorough
signed and encrypted messages. Each Agent accesses the
wallet and performs cryptographic functions for that entity.
Edge Agent: This agent is hosted on the user’s device (edge
of the network) such as mobiles, tablets or laptops. This
agent may be connected to another app and accesses a wallet
containing keys and credentials, performing cryptographic
functions for that entity.
Cloud Agent: This agent is hosted on the cloud which is
not directly controlled by an identity owner. The edge agent
communicates with cloud agent that runs 24x7 and offers a
store and forward service to route requests to and from the
edge agent.
2) Sovrin Nodes:
A node is a server that runs an instance of the code required
to operate a ledger. A node can either be a validator node or
an observer node; however, it can only act one at a time.
Observer Node: This node runs the read only instance of the
ledger. Anyone can run this node in any numbers; however,
its response can be verified by State Proofs.
Validator Node: This node validates all new transactions
and writes to the ledger based on the consensus protocol. A
steward runs one validator node at a time.
3) Sovrin Ledgers:
It is a distributed ledger for maintaining the records of
different types of transactions.
Config Ledger: This is a special ledger for recording trans-
actions related to the configuration of a ledger. It is not public
writeable and only Sovrin trustees or their delegates can write
to this ledger.
Node Ledger: This ledger is for recording transactions
related to identification of authorized nodes. This ledger is
public readable but not public writeable and only trustees or
stewards can write to this ledger.
Fig. 7. Sovrin SSI Components
Domain Ledger: This ledger is for recording transactions
related to identity management (except payments). This ledger
is public readable and public writeable based on the protection
method of the Sovrin Governance Framework [18].
Payment Ledger: This ledger is for recording transactions
related to payments. It is public readable and public write-
able based on the public write access method of the Sovrin
Governance Framework [18].
V. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF UPORT AND SOVRIN
BASED ON THE PROPOSED SPECIFICATIONS
Table I displays the comparative evaluation of uPort and
Sovrin SSI solutions based on the proposed SSI specifications.
This comparative evaluation shows that both uPort and Sovrin
satisfy the major SSI specifications of sovereignty, storage-
control, longevity and verifiability which are fundamental
requirements for SSI solutions. Furthermore, they support
recovery, cost-free, security, privacy, safeguard and accessi-
bility specifications, however, their degree of support varies
with each specification for example Sovrin presently offers
greater security and privacy features, whilst the uPort design
architecture is simple and easy to use. The crucial commercial
and operational specifications of availability, transparency,
portability and interoperability are yet to fulfilled completely
by uPort and Sovrin in order to establish them as a mature
SSI solution. As SSI is an emerging IDM model and uPort
and Sovrin are emerging SSI solutions, therefore, the suc-
cessful implementation of these commercial and operational
specifications require the development and adaptation of a
set of common protocols and standards provided by standard
organisations such as the Decentralized Identity Foundation
(DIF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and the
Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information
Standards (OASIS). Presently, the scalability specification is
one of the important implementation issues for both uPort
and Sovrin, currently being resolved by employing various
design optimisation techniques to fulfil the growing demands
of sovereign identity globally.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed necessary specifications for evaluating
emerging SSI solutions. Subsequently, it analysed two emerg-
ing SSI solutions uPort and Sovrin including their architecture,
components and working. Finally, this paper evaluated both
uPort and Sovrin SSI solutions to ascertain whether they
comply with the proposed SSI specifications, highlighting their
strengths and limitations. In future, the security aspects of
these two SSI solutions would be analysed. Furthermore, it
is worthwhile analysing some other emerging SSI solutions
based on the proposed SSI specifications.
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TABLE I
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF UPORT AND SOVRIN SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY SOLUTIONS BASED ON THE PROPOSED SPECIFICATIONS
Specifications uPort Sovrin
1. Sovereignty It is a self-sovereign identity. It is a self-sovereign identity.
2. Storage-Control
Identity and its associated personal and
confidential data is stored in the Digital Wallet at
the device owned and controlled by the identity
owner.
Identity and its associated personal and
confidential data is stored in the Edge Wallet at
the device of Edge Agent controlled by the
identity owner; It may be stored in the Cloud
Wallet at the device of Cloud Agent (protected
from unauthorized access).
3. Longevity It utilises Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs). It utilises Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs).
4. Verifiability It utilises Verifiable Credentials (VCs). It utilises Verifiable Credentials (VCs).
5. Recovery
Social Recovery Method: Recovery Delegates (e.g.
selected family members, friends or institutions)
nominated by an identity owner, who can assist
the user to regain its uPort identity.
Social Recovery Method: Recovery Key Trustees
trusted by the identity owner store recovery data
on their own agents on the behalf of an identity
owner and help them to recover their identity.
6. Cost-Free Presently identity is free for users, however, alltransactions have an inherent cost.
Presently identity is free for users, and no
financial cost to identity transactions.
7. Security
It requires a PIN/Password and Biometry for
controlling identity through blockchain. Users can
securely publish their identity including transfer
their credentials, sign transactions and control their
keys and data.
It requires a PIN/Password and Biometry for
controlling identity through blockchain. Users can
securely publish their identity including transfer
their credentials, sign transactions and control their
keys and data using powerful cryptography.
8. Privacy
It is a Privacy Preserving. Users do not need to
disclose personal data in order to create uPort
identifiers for low value accounts. It uses various
methods to minimize the correlation of a users
on-chain smart contract interactions between
different dapps.
It is a Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default.
It uses anonymous credentials based on
Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), which allows
users to share the information that maintain the
anonymity of users.
9. Safeguard Users right to privacy should be protected. Users right to privacy should be protected.
10. Accessibility Simple design architecture and easy to use. Atpresent it has no provision of a Guardian/Agent.
Complex design architecture and some users might
require a Guardian to manage the identity on their
behalf.
11. Availability Users should require their smart-phone to managetheir identity.
Users should require smart-phone but not
necessarily its ownership.
12. Transparency It is based on open standards and open sourceprojects.
It is based on open standards and open source
projects.
13. Portability
It is limited, however, uPort is using several open
standards to make it portable, e.g., Verifiable
Credential (VC) and Decentralized IDentifier
(DID).
It is limited, however, Sovrin is using several open
standards to make it portable, e.g., Verifiable
Credential (VC) and Decentralized IDentifier
(DID).
14. Interoperability Presently it is evolving, therefore, it requires afurther alignment with other SSI solutions.
Presently it is evolving, therefore, it requires a
further alignment with other SSI solutions.
15. Scalability
It is limited. The public Ethereum blockchain can
process nearly 15 transactions per second. It is
resolving this by avoiding creation of multiple
smart contracts on the blockchain and letting users
to create Ethereum key pair.
It is limited. It is resolving this by using two rings
of nodes: a ring of validator nodes to accept write
transactions, and a much bigger ring of observer
nodes to run read-only copies of the blockchain to
process read requests.
